Configuration - Pactmark

Compatibility: Pactmark 0.1.x. Configuration is constructor input, not ambient magic. There is no global config object, no environment-variable convention, and no hidden default client.

The principle

const runtime = createRuntime({
  clock,
  idGenerator,
  eventStore,
  acceptedWorkOrderStore,
  commandRecordStore,
  contextStore,
  inputSubmissionStore,
  artifactStore,
  evidenceRecordStore,
  transactionRunner,
  authorityIssuer,
  admissionController,
  policy,
  grantIssuer,
  decisionChallengeIssuer,
  decisionStore,
  modelCredentialIssuer,
  toolCredentialIssuer,
  toolExecutor,
  egressBroker,
  verifierRegistry,
  evidenceBuilder,
  telemetry,
  wakeupDriver,
  requiredRuntimeCapabilities,
});

Long, and deliberately so. Every line is a decision you can point at during a review.

Development versus production

import { createLocalRuntime, createLocalAuthorityIssuer } from "@pactmark/agent";

const local = createLocalAuthorityIssuer();
const runtime = createLocalRuntime({
  agents: [myAgent],
  authorityIssuer: local.issuer,
});
// Deterministic memory-backed defaults. Reports its own limits.

import { createRuntime } from "@pactmark/agent";
import { createPostgresStores } from "@pactmark/store-postgres";
import {
  createDeclaredToolExecutor,
  createDenyAllEgressBroker,
} from "@pactmark/executor-in-process";

const stores = createPostgresStores({ pool, securityProfile });

const runtime = createRuntime({
  ...stores,
  authorityIssuer: hostAuthorityIssuer,   // from your authenticated host
  admissionController,
  policy,
  toolExecutor: createDeclaredToolExecutor(tools),
  egressBroker: createAllowlistEgressBroker(allowlist),
  // …every remaining port supplied explicitly
});

Deny-all defaults exist for a reason

core exports explicit deny-all implementations:

import {
  DenyAllModelCredentialIssuer,
  DenyAllModelCredentialResolver,
  DenyAllSecretRefStore,
  DenyAllSecretResolver,
  DenyAllToolCredentialIssuer,
} from "@pactmark/core";

Use them wherever a capability is genuinely not needed. They make “we do not do that here” an explicit, greppable statement instead of an absence. Similarly, createDenyAllEgressBroker() is the correct egress broker for a runtime whose tools declare egress: { mode: "none" }.

Runtime capabilities

const capabilities: RuntimeCapabilities = {
  schemaVersion: "1",
  executionProfile: "durable",
  durableStorage: true,
  protectedContext: true,
  protectedWorkOrders: true,
  protectedInputSubmissions: true,
  streaming: true,
  cancellation: true,
  sandbox: "unsafe_local",
  networkPolicy: "declared",
  backgroundWakeup: true,
  atomicCommandAndWakeup: true,
  humanDecisions: true,
  typedInput: true,
  effectReconciliation: true,
  compensation: true,
  modelCredentials: true,
  toolCredentials: true,
  telemetry: "metadata",
  transactionDomains: ["postgres.primary"],
};

Declare honestly. An agent that requires a capability the runtime does not provide fails with KAF_RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_MISSING before the run starts — which only works if your declaration is true.

Readiness profiles

Profile	Intended for	Typical outcome
`local`	Development and tests	Passes with memory stores
`preview`	Non-production demonstrations	Passes with a clearly-marked anonymous authority
`production`	Real work	Rejects missing durability, atomicity, registered effect strategies, bounded model resources, credential enforcement or host capability

const report = runtime.evaluateReadiness({ profile: "production" });
if (!report.ready) {
  logger.error({ gaps: report.gaps }, "runtime not production-ready");
}

Environment variables

Pactmark itself reads none. Your host may:

readEnvironment: () => ({
  PACTMARK_PROFILE: process.env.PACTMARK_PROFILE,
  DATABASE_URL: process.env.DATABASE_URL,
});

Read environment variables at request time inside the adapter, not at module scope. Module-scope reads can be captured into a build artefact, and they make a value that should be a per-request decision into a per-deploy one.

A configuration review checklist

Is every capability declaration true?

A false durableStorage: true disables the protection that would have caught the problem.

Is the authority issuer host-owned?

createLocalAuthorityIssuer in a production path is a critical finding.

Is the egress broker restrictive?

Deny-all unless a tool declares an allowlist.

Are unused credential ports explicitly deny-all?

Rather than absent or permissive.

Does readiness pass in the target environment?

Run doctor --profile production there, not on a laptop.

Agent API

CreateRuntimeInput and the facade it returns.

Readiness checklist

The operational form of this page.

​The principle

​Development versus production

​Deny-all defaults exist for a reason

​Runtime capabilities

​Readiness profiles

​Environment variables

​A configuration review checklist

Agent API

Readiness checklist

The principle

Development versus production

Deny-all defaults exist for a reason

Runtime capabilities

Readiness profiles

Environment variables

A configuration review checklist